MFG and Dalton Blamed for 2004 Toxic Vapor Injurie
Dalton, GA, April 12, 2006--In their final report, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) concluded that better process design, engineering, and hazard analysis would likely have prevented the 2004 runaway chemical reaction and toxic vapor cloud release at MFG Chemical Inc. The report also said that inadequate emergency planning by the facility, city and county contributed to the severity of the event.
The report was released yesterday at a news conference in Dalton and also posted to the agency's web site, CSB.gov.
More than 200 families were forced to evacuate from their homes and 154 people had to be decontaminated and treated for chemical exposure at a local hospital after toxic allyl alcohol and allyl chloride were released from a reactor at the MFG facility on April 12, 2004. Thirteen police officers and two ambulance personnel were also treated, and one MFG worker suffered chemical burns. CSB investigators found that the accident occurred when a self-accelerating or "runaway" chemical reaction rapidly pressurized a 4,000-gallon chemical reactor, activating an emergency vent and releasing allyl alcohol and allyl chloride directly into the atmosphere.
CSB Chairman Carolyn Merritt said, "As the CSB pointed out in its 2002 study of reactive chemical hazards, these accidents often occur when companies do not effectively research the available literature, conduct thorough process hazard analyses, examine possible accident scenarios, and implement appropriate safety controls. The 2004 accident in Dalton underscores the vital role of communities in preparing for chemical accidents and minimizing the harm to the public. Effective prevention and effective emergency planning go hand-in-hand."
The accident occurred during the company's first attempt to make a production-scale batch of triallyl cyanurate (TAC), a chemical used in rubber manufacturing. Investigators determined that MFG, which was producing TAC under contract with New Jersey-based GP Chemical, had not fully evaluated the hazards of the TAC-producing reaction, including a review of readily available technical literature. The report pointed specifically to published reports of two previous runaway reactions and fires that occurred during attempts to produce TAC. The CSB's 2002 study estimated that over 90 percent of significant reactive chemical incidents involve hazards that are already documented in publicly available literature.
"MFG did not adequately plan for scaling up the reaction from the laboratory to full production volume or evaluate how much heat the reaction would produce," CSB lead investigator John Vorderbrueggen said. "The process controls, instrumentation, and safety systems were not designed to prevent a runaway reaction and uncontrolled chemical release. If MFG had followed the good engineering and safety practices described in federal regulations, this accident likely would not have occurred." Mr. Vorderbrueggen said that the process MFG was attempting was covered under both the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Process Safety Management (PSM) standard and the Environmental Protection Agency's Risk Management Program rule.
Inadequate emergency response planning by the City of Dalton and Whitfield County was a contributing cause of the injuries and exposures among the public and responders, the CSB said. None of the responding police officers had the proper training or protective equipment to safely enter the toxic vapor cloud. The city had no automated emergency notification system or evacuation plan, and police officers were instructed to drive into the chemical cloud to alert neighborhood residents to evacuate. After the toxic vapor forced the unprotected police officers to retreat, firefighters wearing special breathing apparatus were eventually called in to complete the evacuation.
(This story is continued in Part II, similarly listed in today's news.)
